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I. INTRODUCTION
Constructing our information environment as one composed of
information "from diverse and antagonistic sources"' has been a central
focus of structural regulation and its First Amendment justification for half
a century. In the twentieth century, structural media regulation meant
* Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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tinkering with the configuration of a mass media market aimed at eyeballs.
For example, group ownership and duopoly rules, licensing criteria like
diversity and localism, financial interest and syndication rules, or cable
access rules, took the basic structure of mass media markets as given, and
tried to make sure that this basic structure delivered somewhat more
diverse content than it would if left to its own devices. Technology now
makes possible the attainment of decentralization and democratization by
enabling small groups of constituents and individuals to become users-
participants in the production of their information environment-rather
than by lightly regulating concentrated commercial mass media to make
them better serve individuals conceived as passive consumers. Structural
media regulation in the twenty-first century must, in turn, focus on enabling
a wide distribution of the capacity to produce and disseminate information
as a more effective and normatively attractive approach to serve the goals
that have traditionally animated structural media regulation.
As the digitally networked environment matures, regulatory choices
abound that implicate whether the network will be one of peer users or one
of active producers who serve a menu of prepackaged information goods to
consumers whose role is limited to selecting from this menu. These choices
occur at all levels of the information environment: the physical
infrastructure layer-wires, cable, radio frequency spectrum-the logical
infrastructure layer-software-and the content layer. At the physical
infrastructure level, we are seeing it in such decisions as the digital TV
orders (DTV Orders), or the question of open access to cable broadband
services, and the stunted availability of license-free spectrum. At the
logical layer, we see laws like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA)2 and the technology control litigation that has followed hard upon
its heels, as owners of copyrighted works attempt to lock up the software
layer so as to permit them to control all valuable uses of their works.3 At
the content layer, we have seen an enclosure movement aimed at enabling
information vendors to capture all the downstream value of their
information. This enclosure raises the costs of becoming a user-rather
than a consumer-of information and undermines the possibility of
2. See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.A).
3. See, e.g., Recording Industry Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180
F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) (permitting manufacture and sales of Rio, a portable MP3 player,
against recording industry challenge); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, No. 00
Civ. 0277 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2000), available at (Mar. 19, 2000)
<http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtweb/pdf/00-01149.PDF>; DVD Copy Control Ass'n,
Inc. v. McLaughlin, No. CV 786804 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2000), available at (Mar. 19,
2000) <http://www.eff.org/iplVideo/DVDCCA-case/20000120-pi-order.html> (facing
similar issues framed under California trade secret law).
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becoming a producer/user of information for reasons other than profit, by
means other than sales.
At all these levels, the fundamental commitment of our democracy to
secure "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources,' 4 which has traditionally animated structural media
regulation, should be on securing a significant component of the
information environment for creative use by users. To implement such an
agenda would require a focus on identifying resources necessary for the
production and exchange of information and fashioning regulatory policies
that make access to and use of these resources equally and ubiquitously
available to all users of the network. Developing a series of commons in
such resources is an important mode of implementation of this
commitment. Other modes could include access and carriage requirements
aimed specifically at making possible the development of a network of peer
users. Identifying and sustaining commons and securing access to
communicative resources are more important focuses for information
policy concerned with democracy than assuring that there are eight rather
than three broadcast networks or that no two networks are under common
ownership.
II. AT THE CROSSROADS
The basic structure of mass media markets emerged in the middle of
the nineteenth century. Harold Innis and James Beniger 6 have described
how the development of high volume, high cost mechanized printing
presses and the telegraph changed the enterprise of the press from a local,
small circulation medium for political and public discourse to a mass scale
demand management system.7 As Innis put it, journalists became people
who write on the back of advertisements.8 After the introduction of
broadcast, a series of business and regulatory decisions channeled this new
4. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20; see also Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520
U.S. 180 (1997); Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976); Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1969);
Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 266 (1964).
5. HAROLD INNIs, THE BIAS OF COMMUNICATION (1951).
6. JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OFTHEINFORMATION SocIETY (1986).
7. Beniger is the one who explained most usefully how advertising in mass media was
introduced to solve the growing gap between the tremendous growth of productivity in the
nineteenth century and the lagging changes in demand patterns. See also ITHIEL DE SOLA
POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM (1984) (describing rise of mass media).
8. See INNIS, supra note 5, at 186.
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medium into the same model,9 and by the late 1920s, the basic structure of
our mass mediated environment was in place.10 This structure relies largely
on a small number of professional, commercial producers seeking to serve
the widest possible audiences. As Baker showed quite comprehensively,"
they do so by providing information and cultural products that have
relatively wide appeal and gloss over, rather than tend to, the diversity of
actual interests and needs of finer divisions within the body of the mass
audience. Nothing captures this better than the metaphor of the market for
eyeballs. This basic structure will remain unaffected as long as we continue
to think of our information and communications policy purely in terms of
securing better service to consumers.
There is an alternative. The Internet graphically represents this for us,
at least as it was in the 1990s. In this information environment, the end
points are users-an ambiguous category from the perspective of an
established conception of an information environment composed of (a
small number of professional) producers and (a large number of passive)
consumers. Users sometimes receive information and sometimes rework it
and send it to others. They can play the roles of producer and consumer.
Their acts of reception are dialogic in the sense that they can easily be
mapped as moves in a conversation rather than as endpoints for the
delivery of a product.1
This alternative is neither utopian nor preordained. It is possible to
have a system that breaks through the clear cut categories of producer and
consumer. For decades, individuals have been willing to pay much more
for the privilege of participating in conversations than to receive
professional content-expenditures on long-distance and local telephones
have been greater than expenditures on newspapers, magazines, broadcast,
cable, and movies put together. 3 A combination of technology, business
9. See GLEASON L. ARCHER, HISTORY OF RADIO TO 1926 (1938); ERIK BARNOUW, A
TowER IN BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNIrED STATES (1966); BENIGER,
supra note 6, 362-70; PHILIP T. ROSEN, THE MODERN STENTORS: RADIO BROADCASTERS AND
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1920-1934 (1980).
10. See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the
Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 287, 299-318 (1998).
11. See C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311
(1997).
12. I have provided a more detailed breakdown of the differences between the broadcast
model of communication and the internet model in Yochai Benkler, Communications
Infrastructure Regulation and the Distribution of Control over Content, 22 TELECOMMS.
POL'Y 183 (1998).
13. That these prices were inflated by monopolies does nothing to undermine the
conclusion that people were willing to spend much more on speaking than on receiving
mass-marketed content.
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organization, and law prevented the emergence of a widely decentralized
information environment where production and consumption are less
starkly separated.'
4
Today, as the Internet and the digitally networked environment
present us with a new set of regulatory choices, it is important to set our
eyes on the right prize. That prize is not the Great Shopping Mall in
Cyberspace. That prize is the Great Agora-the unmediated conversation
of the many with the many.
III. WHY USERS?
DEMOCRACY, PERSONAL AUTONOMY, AND COMMUNICATION
In a series of cases in which the Supreme Court reviewed various
media regulations, the Court has steadily developed an understanding that
decentralization of information production is a policy that serves values
central to the First Amendment.15 Most pithily captured in Justice Black's
statement in United States v. Associated Press, since adopted in other
cases in this line-Red Lion and the two Turner cases-it is central to the
values served by the First Amendment that we secure "the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."' 7
These cases represent a central problem of modem First Amendment
law. First identified in 1947 by Zechariah Chafee" and the Commission on
Freedom of the Press (Commission) that he vice-chaired, 9 the problem
arises from the technological and economic fact that different people and
organizations in society have very different power to affect the flow of
information in society. In particular, the owners of mass media outlets have
an unusual degree of control over who gets to say what in the public arena.
The problem arises when government intervenes to regulate media outlets
with the specific intent of serving the values underlying the First
Amendment-robust debate, diversity of viewpoints, and individual
expressive freedom. The hope for such regulation is that it will in fact
implement these core values. The fear, of which Chafee and the
Commission writing at the dawn of the second red scare were well aware,
14. See Benider, supra note 12; Benkler, supra note 10, at 299-318.
15. For a more complete review of these cases and my conclusions from them, see
Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 366-86 (1999).
16. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
17. 1d, at 20.
18. See 2 ZEcHARIAH CHAFES, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNIcATiONs 471-719
(1947).
19. THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESs, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 1-12
(1947).
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was not only, or even primarily, that regulators would do a poor job and
discourage as much as encourage valuable speech.23 The problem is that
government might use its power to suppress speech it disagrees with under
the guise of regulating to enhance freedom of speech, and that government
would get too comfortable with the idea of regulating communications
markets and regulate well beyond what is necessary to assure robust, open
discourse.21
The problem of how to reconcile the fear of government intervention
with the reality of a tightly controlled media industry that provides
relatively little diversity and less access to most of society's constituents
has since been taken up by others. Jerome Barron's work on access rights
was the high water mark of the direct translation of these insights into a
claim for constitutionally based access rights to the means of public
•22
discourse. It largely broke on the shoals of Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo.23 Since then, Baker,24 Fiss,25 and Sunstein 26 have developed
extensive and sophisticated justifications for the adoption of speech-
enhancing policies.
It is all too simple and misleading to ignore the centrality of the
electronic media regulation cases to our understanding of the values we
ought to pursue in our information and communications policy. We have
the imperious tone of Miami Herald to sooth us into believing that it, rather
than these aberrant cases, is the norm adopted by the First Amendment, and
they are the deviant. The media regulation cases themselves rely on
technology, special market conditions, or newness of the technology to
justify their positions. But at the end of the day, we are left with a
remarkable and robust state of affairs. "Special" regulatory regimes that
look more leniently on carriage regulation or access requirements than the
supposedly normal case, which has come to apply primarily to the printed
page, cover all electronic carriage media-wireless, coaxial cable, twisted
pair, or other telecommunications media.
20. See CHAFEE, supra note 18, at 475-76.
21. See id. at 476-77.
22. See JEROME BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACCESs TO
MASS MEDIA (1973); Jerome Barron, Access to the Press-A First Amendment Right?, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967).
23. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
24. See C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1998);
Baker, supra note 11, at 322-44.
25. See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1987).
26. See CASs R. SUNsTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
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The basic commitment that explains this "anomaly" is most plainly
stated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: 27 "It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that
market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee."'
More recently, the Court in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
(Turner 1)29 reiterated that "[t]he potential for abuse of this private power
over a central avenue of communication cannot be overlooked. The First
Amendment's command that government not impede the freedom of
speech does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that
private interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway
of communication, the free flow of information and ideas."3°
The Court sees the first amendment as embodying a commitment to
robust public discourse and individual expressive freedom, not as a
technical rule against regulation qua regulation. As the technological and
economic parameters of mass media concentrated, commercialized, and
homogenized information production and exchange, the Court accepted the
potential necessity of government regulation to counteract these effects in
service of a more robust and free exchange of ideas. The fear expressed by
Chafee-that government could abuse benign media regulation or could
simply get it so wrong as to have significant deleterious effects on free
speech-has evolved into the heightened scrutiny adopted in Turner L
There, while accepting the potential legitimacy and importance of must-
carry regulation, the Court nonetheless retained an important role in
examining this benign legislation precisely to verify that it is in fact benign,
rather than either censorial or seriously ill advised.
In the digitally networked environment, there is a better way to serve
the goals that have long justified structural media regulation. This
environment could, in principle, be designed on a widely distributed model,
where individuals and small groups can express themselves, exchange
views, and create their own information environment with a reach and
efficacy not possible since the rise of mass media.
The reasons underlying this potential shift in the capacity to produce
the information environment are the radical reduction in the cost of
processors and the flat, distributed design of the Internet. Together these
mean that relatively cheap end points in a network-computers-can
produce quite sophisticated communications, access the Internet, and
27. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
28. Id. at 390.
29. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
30. Id. at 657 (citations omitted).
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disseminate them more or less everywhere. Technically, the Internet has no
center to control who gets to say what to whom. Economically, the low cost
of producing and communicating information means that the old points of
concentration-the presses and distribution systems, the broadcast
transmitters and licenses, the cable systems-no longer present the same
insurmountable barriers to entry to becoming a speaker as they do in the
mass mediated environment.
On its face, this suggests that the emergence of the digitally
networked environment would counsel a no-regulation approach. The mass
mediated environment is no longer the sole source of widely available
information exchange. The alternative-the digitally networked
environment-no longer suffers from the same structural imbalances that
traditionally justified regulation. One might imagine that this is the time for
the regulators to rest.
A closer look suggests something quite different. We are making
regulatory choices at all layers of the information environment-the
physical infrastructure, logical infrastructure, and content layers-that
threaten to concentrate the digital environment as it becomes more central
to our social conversation. These include decisions about intellectual
property law, which can make ownership of content a point of
reconcentration, decisions about the design of software and its standards,
and the regulation of physical infrastructure available to Internet
communications, like cable broadband services. At all these layers, the
wrong decisions could enable a reproduction of the mass media model,
with all its shortcomings, in the digitally networked environment. Avoiding
making these mistakes should be the focus of the efforts we have
traditionally focused on structural media regulation. An open, free, flat,
peer-to-peer network best serves the ability of anyone-individual, small
group, or large group-to come together to build our information
environment. It is through such open and equal participation that we will
best secure both robust democratic discourse and individual expressive
freedom.
IV. REPRODUCTION OF THE CONSUMER-PRODUCER
RELATIONSHIP AT THE CONTENT LAYER
No case more starkly represents the concentrating effect of a law that
assumes a producer-consumer model than the Los Angeles Times v. Free
Republic case.31 In late 1999, the Washington Post and the Los Angeles
Times persuaded a district court that individual users could not cut and
31. No. 98-7840 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1998), available at (visited Mar. 17, 2000)
<http:lwww.techlawjoumal.comlcourts/freereplDefault.htm>.
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paste stories from their papers onto a political discussion forum. The Free
Republic Web site is a gathering place for conservatives and offered a
forum where users could post newspaper stories with a comment, and
where others could then comment on the piece as well. Sometimes, the
users presented these stories as evidence of the leftist bias of the media.
The Free Republic forum presents the alternate universe, in which the end
points of the information environment are users, rather than consumers.
"Quality" in this world is not created by higher fidelity or more celebrity
participation. It is created by shared values and a sense of knowing one's
interlocutors and conversing with them. It is a quality created by a diversity
of viewpoints as wide and multifarious as the many users who participate
in this conversation.
The court in the Free Republic, donning its "intellectual property"
rather than "public discourse" hat, went out of its way to characterize the
Free Republic Web site-which charges no user fees but accepts donations
and cross-posts advertisements from other conservative sites-as a
commercial use and to deny the quotation of the articles a fair use privilege
under the Copyright Act. The court also rejected the defendants' arguments
that enjoining them from using the newspaper stories to criticize their bias
put the Copyright Act, so interpreted, in direct conflict with the First
Amendment.
The assumption and consequences of this ruling are illuminating. The
assumption is that public discourse is best served by increasing incentives
to professional, commercial producers who rely on copyright to sell their
products, even at the expense of individual users who are thereby prevented
from engaging in public discourse. Such discourse will only be available to
people who have the time to author their own accounts of the underlying
facts, and the insights of individual nonprofessional critics will be available
only to those willing to go back and forth among multiple sites to get both
the critique and the original to which the critique may link (assuming,
contrary to current trends, that linking to a specific article does not itself
become the subject of some manner of exclusive right).32
This decision is a quintessential instance of a self-fulfilling perception
of the world. One starts with an assumption that there are producers and
consumers and that consumers are better off when producers have high
incentives to produce. One then creates a regulatory system that increases
the incentives for commercial production but also increases the costs of
32. The relevant case, settled out of court, is Ticketmaster's suit against Microsoft for
linking directly to specific events available on Ticketmaster's site, rather than to
Ticketmaster's home page where the users could be exposed to all the layers of advertising
before reaching the desired event.
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becoming any kind of producer,33 forcing producers to try to recoup these
high entry costs by selling to wide audiences. This results in a relatively
small number of producers able to fund full-time authoring and pay
licensing fees to use existing information, who attempt to recover their
investments by capturing wide audiences. Opposite these producers is a
wide, passive audience of consumers constrained to select what they buy
from a narrow, relatively homogenous menu of choices intended to guess
what a large number of them will select under these conditions. These
producers, in turn, make up the political lobby for continuing the basic
structure as it is. This political economy is responsible for an extensive
enclosure movement that has pushed our intellectual property law toward
ever-increasing centralization, and has squelched concerns that this
galloping propertization is attained at the expense both of innovation and of
robust democratic discourse that a well-balanced intellectual property law
could serve.34
V. REPRODUCTION OF THE CONSUMER-PRODUCER
RELATIONSHIP AT THE LOGICAL LAYER
Imagine a ten-year-old girl doing her homework on the history of the
Holocaust. Her multimedia paper includes a clip from Schindler's List, in
which Oscar Schindler looks over the town and sees a little girl, in red, the
only color image on the screen, walking through the pandemonium. In her
paper, the child superimposes her own face over that of the girl in the film.
The paper is entitled My Grandmother.
33. One generally understood effect of intellectual property rights is that they increase
both expected revenues and costs for producers because information is not only an output
but also an input into the information production process. If a particular use of information
is subject to an exclusive right, then its owner will be able to charge for that use, and others
who wish to make such use as part of their own creative process will incur higher costs. For
a look at how this effect plays out when one explicitly considers a multiplicity of strategies
of appropriation, see Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of
Information Production, available at (visited Mar. 17, 2000)
<http://www.law.nyu.edu/benklery/lpec.PDF>.
34. For a discussion of the political economy, see Yochai Benkler, Constitutional
Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition
of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming April 2000). See
generally Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REv. 857, 869-79 (1987) (describing the nature of the 1976 Act's provisions as a negotiated
settlement among specific stakeholders); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED,
Jan. 1996, at 134, 135; James Boyle, Sold Out, N.Y. TMES, Mar. 31, 1996, at D2; Peter A.
Jaszi, Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a
Constitutionally-grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 595 (1996) (describing industrial policy concerns trumping public interest
concerns in legislative process).
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Fade. In New York, California, and Connecticut, the movie industry
is persuading courts to shape the evolution of digital technology so that My
Grandmother will never be written. In Universal Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes3 5 the court enjoined the distribution of the means by which our
protagonist might cut, paste, and rework the snippet, finding them illegal
under the DMCA. That Act prohibits decrypting code that protects
copyrighted work, and prohibits devices or services that enable such
decoding. The court held that the traditional "fair use" defense-which
would have protected our little girl, as it would a journalist or parodist,
from an old fashioned copyright suit-does not apply to the DMCA, and
that the prohibition on circumventing the encryption of copyrighted works,
even though it can prevent privileged uses of works and is not subject to
fair use, does not violate the First Amendment.
Reimerdes is part of a series of suits that Hollywood brought against
Web sites that distribute or link to decryption software called DeCSS.
DeCSS is software that allows users to circumvent the encryption of DVDs
so as to play them on Linux-based computers. The important thing to
underscore about this case is that the court found that "even if DeCSS were
intended and usable solely to permit the playing, and not the copying, of
DVDs on Linux machines, the playing... would.., violate the statute. 3 6
On this extremely expansive theory, the DMCA permits the owners of
copyright to design the logical layer of the distribution media of their work
to assure that their works are perfectly protected by technology,
irrespective of whether the uses that users are seeking to make of these
works are privileged by law.
An injunction like the one granted in Reimerdes undermines the
availability of our cultural commons as a resource for personal expression
and public discourse. In the predigital environment copyright gave owners
some rights to profit from their work, but law and reality made it
impossible to track or physically prevent all uses of "owned" cultural
products in school papers or personal conversations. Spielberg could
charge for all sorts of ways of viewing Schindler but could not prevent My
Grandmother from being made. This is what made it possible for
commercial vendors of cultural products to coexist with a vibrant public
conversation. Now, movies released in encrypted digital format can be
made impervious to this kind of creative recreation, and the recording
industry can peek into college dorms to see if kids are mixing their own
tapes.
35. No. 00 Civ. 0277 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2000), available at (visited Mar. 17,
2000) <http:llwww.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtweb/pdfO0-O1 149.PDF>.
36. Id. at 9-10 n.14.
Number 31
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
Again, the relationship between the assumption of the centrality of
securing incentives for commercial producers and the consequent design of
the information environment is stark. In securing the perfect pay-per-play
environment, this broad interpretation of the DMCA builds the mass media
model into the very logic of the information environment and undermines
the capacity of each user in this environment to partake of our common
cultural conversation.
VI. REPRODUCTION OF THE CONSUMER-PRODUCER
RELATIONSHIP AT THE PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE LAYER
In April 1997, the FCC concluded a long regulatory process by
allocating three hundred megahertz of broadcast spectrum for digital
television services. 7 Based on an express commitment to preserve the
broadcast model of communications for video programming, the FCC
replicated in its allocation decision the current market structure in
terrestrial television broadcast. First, each existing broadcaster received an
allocation for digital television transmission that covers the same market it
serves by analog television transmissions." Second, the FCC required that
licensees provide: "free digital video programming service the resolution of
which is comparable to or better than that of today's service and aired
during the same time periods that their analog channel is broadcasting."39
Construction and "spectrum recovery" requirements in the DTV Orders
force broadcasters to construct the capabilities for digital television
transmission within two to five years and anticipate elimination of all
analog television broadcasts. Combined, the DTV Orders require both
American households and licensees to purchase expensive new equipment
optimized to deliver digital wireless transmission in the producer/consumer
broadcast model.
Moreover, as the regulatory process advanced, it became clear that the
six-megahertz allotments that each broadcaster would receive were not
necessary to permit the broadcaster to transmit a high definition signal.
Because of the efficiencies of digital transmission relative to analog, more
information could be conveyed over the same bandwidth. The result was
that even as the FCC was deciding to replicate the current broadcast system
in the digital spectrum, it explicitly understood that this decision meant that
these same licensees could now transmit two HDTV programs
37. See Advanced TV Sys. and their Impact upon the Existing TV Brdcst. Serv., Fifth
Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,809, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 863 (1997) (collectively
know as the DTV Orders).
38. See id. at para. 27.
39. Id. at para. 28.
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simultaneously or up to five standard definition programs. The FCC
nonetheless decided to keep the licenses in the hands of incumbents and not
to split the allocations so as to permit new licensees. Congress aggravated
the effect by threatening to remove licenses from broadcasters and
networks that dared suggest they would rather offer more programs than
transmit the same number of programs with more pixels.40 Concerned,
presumably, with public exposure of the folly of granting incumbent
licensees five channels instead of multiplying the number of licensees by
five, the congressional proponents of the DTV giveaway made sure that all
recipients of this bounty transmitted high definition programming.
These decisions kept the cost of becoming a broadcaster artificially
high. First, they required broadcasters to acquire expensive new equipment.
Second, they kept the cost of a license equal to the size of the audience in a
given market divided by the number of analog channels that served it in the
past, instead of one-fifth that price (which would have been the price had
the number of broadcasts been multiplied by the number of channels that
can be broadcast over six megahertz in standard definition). At such a high
cost, the cost of entry into the market for broadcasting remains too high to
permit the emergence of providers with budgets that are independent of
eyeballs captured-like universities or civic organizations.
Three months before it adopted the DTV Orders, the FCC identified a
three hundred megahertz band of radio frequencies and permitted devices
capable of high bandwidth, high speed data transmission rates, and capable
of multiplexing-sharing spectrum without exclusive transmission rights-
to operate without an individual license. This decision (U-NIl Order)"
effectively created a spectrum commons, available as unowned
infrastructure for anyone who buys equipment capable of using it. The U-
NII Band would allow individuals and organizations to purchase computers
with radio communications capabilities and sufficient bandwidth to support
voice and video communications as well as much higher data transmission
rates than those available from most facilities today (up to twenty megabits
per second). The technical parameters necessary to share spectrum allow,
40. See Joel Brinkley, Under Pressure, 2 Broadcasters Decide They Will Run HDTV,
N. Y. TIMEs, Sept. 18, 1997, at D1 (describing how broadcasters like ABC & Sinclair were
forced by Congress to recant their heretical plans to offer multiple programs, including pay-
per-view, over their DTV allocations, and not to offer a single channel in high definition
format).
41. The abbreviation stands for "Unlicensed-National Information Infrastructure," and
reflects the Commission's aspiration that the U-NIl Band could provide a part of the local
infrastructure for the information infrastructure, either replacing LANs or providing a
potential local loop for community networks.
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
almost require, that the U-NII Band be patterned on the Internet model of
communications.42
The U-NIl Order and the DTV Orders push in diametrically opposite
directions. The former encourages the development of an Internet model of
communications for the digitally networked environment if end users invest
hundreds of dollars in home equipment capable of operating in a
distributed, high bandwidth data-transmission environment. The latter
encourages development of a broadcast model of communications for
digitally encoded information if end users invest hundreds of dollars in
buying equipment whose primary design specification is that it can
passively receive high resolution video images.
The institutional choice to foster the deployment of high definition
television as a replica of the NTSC system is a stark example of
institutional choices that can affect information flow patterns in society. It
is by no means the only choice that could have such effect. I have
elsewhere suggested43 the similarities of that choice with the choice made
in the Telecommunications Act of 199644 to permit telephone company
entry into the video delivery market on an open video system model, rather
than on a common carriage model that the FCC had previously adopted.45
Most prominent in current debates is the question of open access to
cable broadband facilities. The question has arisen primarily in the context
of AT&T's emergence as the nation's leading cable operator. AT&T
offered its proprietary cable internet service as the only internet service
available for use with its cable modems and refused to permit any
competing internet service providers (ISPs) to offer service over its system.
This has raised regulatory concerns both at the FCC and in local
franchising authorities.46
The point about cable access needs to be thought of less with AT&T
in mind, however, than with AOL-Time-Wamer. The point to understand is
that if all consumers whose cable system is owned by AOL are offered
broadband Internet access only by AOL, these consumers will end up with
42. For a more complete discussion of the U-NIl Band and its implications for spectrum
management policy, see Benkler, supra note 10.
43. See Benkler, supra note 12.
44. See 47 U.S.C. § 549 (Supp. 11I 1997). Telephone companies who adopt this model
will be rewarded by removal of some regulatory burdens associate with cable operations.
45. See Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-63.58,
Second Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781 (1992).
46. An FCC Staff report summarizes the problem and cases relating to it. See
Broadband Today, available at <http:llwww.fcc.govlBureaus/Cable/Reports/
broadbandtoday.pdf.
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something that is more like a five hundred channel cable system than a
peer-to-peer network of users. AOL is a company whose business model
depends on capturing consumers who do not know what "getting on the
internet" means, and then persuading these consumers to pay a premium
for access that is not to the Internet primarily but to AOL proprietary
content. It is immensely successful in this business model. With its new
cable systems and Time-Warner content, it could design a system where
most default choices lead consumers to stay within the AOL-Time-Warner
system, rather than to venture outside of it.
Furthermore, whether the "technical reasons" that cable broadband
services cite are real or imagined, the reality is that there is vast asymmetry
in the information flows of these networks. Designed to carry broadcast-
like signals, cable systems offer tremendous downstream, to-the-consumer
flows, and narrow upstream flows. These companies, for example, prohibit
users from using their connection to host a server-to become a competing
producer of information, as opposed to merely its consumer.47 They also
prohibit video streaming for over ten minutes, which could have enabled
small video producers or local town hall meetings to use this medium as
competing sources of real time video images of cultural products or
political or other public conversations.
Competing ISPs can compete with an AOL-Time Warner precisely by
offering users different types of capacities over the same system. These
ISPs are the primary potential separating agent between the ownership of
the carriage medium and control of the content. Two or three or even five
or six such ISPs could replicate the same business model as I ascribed to
AOL-Time-Warner, integrating with other owners of large inventories of
proprietary materials. But if the number of ISPs competing in this market
approaches that of the ISPs offering Internet access over telephone wires,
then there must develop a significant market whose role is to enable users
to provide information, rather than merely to access it. That is the core
point at which the five hundred channel model flips over to an Internet
model of peer users.
VII. INTERMEZzO
What we see in looking at a series of regulatory choices made in
various contexts is that choices that assume a producer/consumer model
often perpetuate this model by regulating in a manner that increases the
47. See R. H. Lewis, Picking the Right Data Superhighway, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 11, 1999,
at G1. (surveying broadband services and finding that "The two leading cable data services,
Time Warner's Roadrunner and @Home, forbid residential customers to run Web server
computers on the network.").
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costs of becoming a producer of information. Such increases in costs lead
to three effects:
0 Concentration-because the cost of becoming a professional
provider of the type whose activity is facilitated by the regulation creates
an entry barrier.
* Commercialization-because of the high cost providers must
adopt a strategy that relies on sale of their information and cultural
products, and it becomes more difficult to sustain production on a
noncommercial model
* Homogenization-because most producers must be commercial,
their reasons to produce are similar, and their need to attract wide
audiences leads to convergence of the content towards the mainstream
and the inoffensive.
VIE. FROM PROPERTY AND FREE/AFFORDABLE RECEPTION TO
COMMONS AND UBIQUITOUS ACCESS
Two policy goals should be the operative midlevel goals for
implementing a commitment to enable the development of a network of
peers. The first is a commitment to identifying and sustaining a series of
commons in the resources necessary for the production and exchange of
information. The second is a shift in the focus of the distributive policies
from low cost or free reception-through, most obviously, subsidies to
over-the-air television-to ubiquitous access to the facilities necessary for
production and dissemination of information.
In the preceding Part, I alluded to the commons in two layers: the
physical infrastructure and content layer. With the former, the U-NIL and an
expansion of the same principles to ultra wideband devices that would
operate underneath many licensed services provide the obvious example.
For over half a decade commentators like Paul Baran, George Gilder, and
most extensively Eli Noam, have suggested that the introduction of spread
spectrum and other multiplexing techniques undermine the perceived
necessity to ration spectrum by granting either licenses or property rights.48
I have explained why, in combination with a robust end user equipment
48. See George Gilder, The New Rule of the Wireless, FORBES, Mar. 29, 1993; Eli
Noam, Spectrum Auction: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy, Tomorrow's
Anachronism: Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J. LAW & ECON. 765
(1998); Eli Noam, Taking the Next Step Beyond Spectrum Auctions: Open Spectrum Access,
33 IEEE COMM. MAG. 66 (1995); Paul Baran, Visions of the 21st Century Communications:
Is the Shortage of Radio Spectrum for Broadband Networks of the Future a Self Made
Problem? Keynote Talk Address at the 8th Annual Conference on Next Generation
Networks (Washington, D.C. Nov. 9, 1994), available at <http://www.eff.org/pub/GlNII
Wireless_cellular_radio/falsescarcitybarancngn94.transcript>.
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market, these technological developments enable a sustainable shift from
any form of organizational clearance-be it by a licensee, an owner of
spectrum, or the clearinghouse proposed by Noam-to an Internet-like
system that relies on end user equipment-based queuing protocols to
coordinate communications. While such a system may not perfectly serve
all real-time communications with assured quality of service, it could well
offer an infrastructure of first and last resort for many valuable
communications that users care about-data transmission, including
delayed video delivery, asynchronous communications, online games,
community (voice and video) chat rooms, or even the ability to participate
in the local town hall video conference with occasional low resolution
blips.
The commons in the air will not supplant licensed services or wired
services, but will offer a fundamental, universally available infrastructure
that each user can use for whatever he or she desires, subject only to the
etiquette of sharing this commons. And that is precisely the point of
securing a commons in an input necessary for information production and
exchange. It is not intended to supplant all other forms of creating and
disseminating information. Rather, it is intended to offer a background
resource available to all as users.
A robust public domain in existing information and in various
creative uses of copyrighted or otherwise exclusively owned information
similarly is not intended to displace professional commercial production. It
is, however, intended to assure that enough cultural raw material is
available to nonprofessionals for reworking, so that users can create their
own collages and expressions of the world and participate in the production
of their own information environment.
At the logical layer, this requires self-conscious policy choices to
support the development of free software and open source strategies for
software development. Most urgently, it means that policy should resist the
efforts of owners of copyrighted materials to quash the development of
software that gives users the power to manipulate and fit to their own needs
the cultural or information products that they use. It is of central
importance to reverse the attempts to use the DMCA to close up the
software layer of the information environment and diminish the possibility
that a robust public domain will in fact lead to widespread accessibility to
the basic building blocks of participation in our public conversation.
Judicially, this would require rejection of technology control suits
such as those described in the preceding Part. Legislatively, this reversal
49. See Benkler, supra note 12, at 299-318.
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should take the form of introducing an explicit general fair use exemption
from the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA-so users who have a
privilege to use the materials kept under digital lock also have a privilege to
open the lock. It also requires a privilege for the makers of software that
enables users to access information for the DMCA's antidevice provision.
Just as the makers of VCRs are not liable for manufacturing machines
capable of illegally coping movies as well as time-shifting broadcasts, so,
too, makers of circumvention facilities with substantial noninfringing uses
should be exempt from liability.
Where, as in the case of cable-based broadband services, a commons
cannot be secured because the economics of the resource are incompatible
with a sustainable commons, structural policy should focus on access. Once
legislatures conceive those whose welfare they serve as users, rather than
as consumers, the relevant focus of regulation should shift to enabling the
widest possible range of users to use the resource for active
communication, not simply for passive reception.
An example of such a focus could be the currently considered public
interest obligations of the DTV licensees.50 Recall that one of the effects of
digitization is that a six-megahertz channel can carry up to two HDTV or
five standard definition television signals. These can also be scrambled,
and hence offered on a pay, rather than free basis. A user-focused public
interest obligation would not focus on attempting to create some content
requirements vague and general enough to withstand First Amendment
challenge. A more appropriate focus is the importation of a concept from
cable-public, educational, and governmental access channels-on one
standard definition channel, coupled with a requirement to devote a
percentage of fees collected from pay services, if any, to fund facilities
available to those individuals and organizations who take advantage of the
access channels. While this is not a first-best solution as compared to much
wider distribution of licenses, it is a better solution, given that the FCC
granted licenses to the incumbent broadcasters in the way that it did, than
requirements focused on quality of programming. In other words, rather
than try to guess what the viewers want but do not get from commercial
broadcasters, the regulation would structure part of the medium to allow
users to communicate what they consider to be worthwhile communicating
via the medium.
Similarly, in the question of broadband over cable, the correct focus
in evaluating the AOL-Time-Wamer merger, for example, should be on
cable access-on the extent to which the infrastructure is open to
50. See Public Interest Obligations of TV Brdcst. License, Notice of Inquiry, 1999 WL
1211119 (Dec. 15, 1999) (MM Docket No. 99-360).
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competing ISPs to offer service. If the owner of a large content library and
an ISP that aims to keep its consumers within the bounds of its proprietary
services in order to market their eyeballs to advertisers will be the sole
gateway to those broadband users who have cable modems, many of them
will remain consumers. Access for competing ISPs would serve in this case
to introduce an element into the broadband delivery system whose
incentives are to enable users to be users. This, in turn, is what will
facilitate the transition of users of broadband Internet access over cable
from consumers to users.
IX. CONCLUSION
The emergence of the digitally networked environment makes
possible the development of a robust, open social conversation in which all
can participate as peers. This technological and economic possibility is not,
however, preordained. Decisions about the organization and regulation of
the content, logical, and physical layers of the Internet will determine
whether the digital environment will eventually, in large measure, replicate
the mass media model, or whether it will indeed change the deep structure
of our information environment. The focus of the policy concerns that have
traditionally justified structural media regulation should, at this time, be
focused on assuring that the digitally networked environment evolves into a
stable system for peer users, rather than towards a system in which
commercial producers and passive consumers are the primary players.
These goals suggest that we develop and sustain commons, wherever
possible, in the resources necessary for the production and exchange of
information, and that we design provisions enabling access to the resources
that cannot be sustained as commons. Such a policy focus would be a more
effective means than traditional structural media regulation of securing
robust democratic discourse and individual expressive freedom.
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